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1. Spaeth, Supreme Court disposition of federal
circuit court decisions, 68 JuDICATURE 245 (1985).
2. Id. at 250. Spaeth explains the significantly
higher reversal rate of the D.C. Circuit in terms of
three factors: "the large number of cases to which
the United States is a party, the court's special rela-
tionship with the Solicitor General, and an accep-
tance rate of cert petitions more than double the rate
of the next highest circuit." Id. at 249.
The possible explanations for the D.C. Circuit's
higher Supreme Court reversal rate are explored in
Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The relationship
Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
and Its Implications for a National Court of
Appeals, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1048 (1984). The authors
attribute it to ideological incompatibility of the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. In consider-
ing the role of the Solicitor General, they reject the
suggestion that the behavior of the Solicitor may be
an independent cause of the D.C. Circuit's high
reversal rate in part because the circuit's affirmance
rate in cases in which the Solicitor General sought
reversal was higher than in cases in which the Solic-
itor General did not participate during the 1980,
1981, 1982 and 1983 Terms. Idat 1063. That pattern
continued in the 1984 Term. Compare Tables 4 and
5. In the Ninth Circuit, the rate of affirmance in
cases in which the Solicitor General sought reversal
was substantially lower than the cases in which he
did not participate in both the 1983 and 1984 Terms.
Compare Table 4 (overall affirmance rate of 6.9 per
cent and 22.6 per cent) with Table 5 (overall affir-
mance rate of zero).
3. Spaeth, supra n. 1, at 249. Spaeth identified
the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits as dominated by
Carter appointees, yet found in the three terms end-
ing in 1982 that they were upheld at close to or
above their overall level. The Ninth Circuit, he
reported, "was upheld at a 39 per cent rate-3
points above its overall level." Id at 249. Spaeth also
notes that the proportions of decisions upheld or
overturned within any given circuit display consid-
erable variation from one term to another, offering
several examples of this phenomenon. Id at 250.
4. Table I permits a comparison of the 1983-85
data reported in this article with the Solicitor Gen-
eral's record for the previous 20 years.
n January 1985, Harold J. Spaeth
presented the results of a survey of
the first 14 terms of the Burger
Court (1969-1982), concluding that
the Court does not differ in the treatment
of federal circuit court decisions depend-
ing on which circuit they emanate from.t
His analysis included two significant
findings:
e With the exception of the D.C. Cir-
cuit, federal circuit court decisions are
treated as an undifferentiated mass from
which the Justices select cases for review. 2
e Circuits dominated by appointees of
President Carter fare no better or worse
than those not so dominated."
I believe both of these conclusions are
premature. The record of the most recent
two terms of the Burger Court convinc-
ingly demonstrates the overwhelming im-
pact of a factor which Professor Spaeth's
data did not take into account: the influ-
ence of the office of the Solicitor General
(see Table 1),' and the data gives rise to a
strong inference that that influence was
used to "target" the circuit most domi-
nated by Carter appointees for special
attention: the Ninth. The Ninth Circuit
is the largest of the federal circuits, includ-
ing the far western states of Alaska, Ariz-
ona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
The Solicitor General's record
The overall record compiled by the office
of the Solicitor General in recent years
can only be described as phenomenal. In
fiscal 1984, 2,861 certiorari petitions were
filed seeking review of opinions of the
Table 1 Record of Solicitor General, 1963-1982
Petitions for certiorari by Solicitor General
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The disproportionate
number of cases
emanating from the
Ninth Circuit is
immediately apparent.
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Only 186, or 6.5
per cent were granted (see Table 2).5 Dur-
ing the 1983-84 Term, the Solicitor Gen-
eral filed 49 petitions seeking review of
opinions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals;
42 were granted, or 85.7 per cent. The
1984-85 Term approximated this record,
with 33 out of 43, or 76.7 per cent of the
Solicitor's petitions from court of appeals
decisions being granted (see Table 3).
Once a petition is granted, the Solici-
tor General also enjoys a greater rate of
success in the outcome of the case than
other litigants. The reversal rate for all
courts of appeals decisions reviewed by
the Supreme Court during the 1983-84
Term was 69.2 per cent. The rate for the
1984-85 Term was 61.9 per cent (see Table
4). Of the 37 courts of appeals decisions
heard on the petition of the Solicitor Gen-
eral during the 1983-84 Term, 32 were
reversed or vacated and 5 were affirmed
(see Table 5).6 The Solicitor General suc-
ceeded in 86.5 per cent of his cases! While
the overall reversal rate dropped 7.3 per
cent during the 1984-85 Term, the Solici-
tor General's success rate for the most
recent term went up: of the 25 cases re-
viewed on petition by the Solicitor, 22.5
were vacated or reversed, and 2.5 were
affirmed (see Table 5).7 The Solicitor suc-
ceeded in 90 per cent of his cases. Com-
menting on the Solicitor's recent success,
one court watcher concluded,
It is hazardous to try to generalize these
patterns into a conclusion about the direc-
tion of the Court. For now, however, a pru-
Table 2 Certiorari petitions from decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals, fiscal year 1984
Total cases Per cent of
disposed of Certiorari decisions in
by U.S. Courts petitions which petitions Petitions Per cent
Circuit of Appeals filed filed granted granted
1st 493 117 23.7 12 10.3
2nd 1,224 260 21.2 24 9.2
3rd 1,360 271 19.9 19 7.0
4th 884 242 27.4 8 3.3
5th 1,702 285 16.7 6 2.1
6th 1,499 315 21.0 21 6.7
7th 1,204 238 19.8 7 2.9
8th 875 174 19.9 6 3.4
9th 2,051 443 21.6 46 10.4
10th 909 124 13.6 5 4.0
11th 1,596 306 19.2 15 4.9
D.C. 530 86 16.2 17 19.8
Totals 14,327 2,861 20.0 186 6.5
Source: 1984 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
Table 3 Certiorari petitions from decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals filed by Solicitor
General, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms
Petitions filed by
Solicitor General Petitions granted Per cent granted
Circuit 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85
1st 1 0 1 0 100.0 -
2nd 1 1 1 1 100.0 100.0
3rd 4 5 4 5 100.0 100.0
4th 2 4 2 4 100.0 100.0
5th 3 2 2 1 66.7 50.0
6th 3 6 3 4 100.0 66.7
7th 2 2 2 1 100.0 50.0
8th 2 3 1 2 50.0 66.7
9th 17 11 14 10 82.4 90.9
10th 3 0 3 0 100.0 -
11th 3 2 2 2 66.7 100.0
D.C. 8 7 7 3 87.5 42.9
Totals 49 43 42 33 85.7 76.7
Compiled from Supreme Court Proceedings reported in United States Law Week, Volume 52 (1983-84) and Volume 53
(1984-85).
dent lawyer would be reluctant to bet
against the federal government in the Su-
preme Court. s
The purpose of this article is not to
marvel at the remarkable success rate of
the Solicitor General, but to inquire
whether the power that this success gen-
erates is utilized to manipulate the docket
of the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General's recent success should be ana-
lyzed in terms of whether he treats fed-
eral circuit decisions as an "undifferen-
tiated mass" from which cases are se-
lected for review, and whether circuits
dominated by Carter appointees fare bet-
ter or worse in his process of selection.
5. Direct appeals from decisions of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals have not been included in the
tables or analysis presented in this article. As noted
by the Federal Judicial Center, REPORT OF THE
STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1972) at p. 34: "More than 99 per cent of all
courts of appeals decisions are now reviewed in the
Supreme Court only by certiorari." The Study
Group recommended that the tiny fraction of cases
in which a statutory right of appeal remained be
brought within the certiorari jurisdiction.
6. The figures in Table 5 do not coincide with
the figures in Table 3, since the cases in which
certiorari petitions were ruled on in the 1983-84
Term were not necessarily decided during that
Since the Solicitor General dominates
from 20-30 per cent of the Court's federal
docket, the answers to these inquiries
will ultimately affect the validity of any
conclusions whether the Court differs in
the treatment of federal circuit court
decisions depending on which circuit
they emanate from.
The Ninth Circuit record
When the total number of certiorari peti-
tions granted is compared to the number
of petitions filed, the variations from
circuit to circuit appear negligible. While
the highest rates of petitions granted
appear in the D.C., Ninth, First and
Term, and the decisions would include some cases
in which certiorari was granted during the previous
Term. In addition, the figures in Table 3 include
cases in which the Court granted review and simul-
taneously vacated thejudgment below for reconsid-
eration in light of an intervening precedent. See
Hellman, Granted, Vacated, and Remanded-Shed-
ding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court
Practice, 67 JUDICATURE 389 (1984). The figures in
Trables 4 and 5 include all cases in which formal
opinions were issued, whether after oral argument
or by summary reversal.
7. See n. 6, supra.
8. Stewart, A Fast Start for the Federal Govern-
ment, A.B.A.J. 108, 113 (March, 1985).
362 Judicature Volume 69, Number 6 April-May, 1986
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Table 4 Outcome of decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewed by the Supreme Court,
1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms.
Number upheld Total reviewed Per cent upheld
Circuit 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85
1st 2.0 2.5 7 5 28.6 50.0
2nd 5.0 6.0 9 11 55.6 54.5
3rd 5.5 3.5 13 9 42.3 38.9
4th 4.5 3.0 8 7 56.3 42.9
5th 3.5 0.5 8 3 43.8 16.7
6th 4.0 7.0 8 15 50.0 46.7
7th 4.5 4.0 6 10 75.0 40.0
8th 2.0 2.0 10 6 20.0 33.3
9th 2.0 7.0 29 31 6.9 22.6
10th 1.0 3.0 6 6 16.7 50.0
11th 2.0 6.0 7 10 28.6 60.0
D.C. 1.0 0.5 9 5 11.1 10.0
Totals 37.0 45.0 120 118 30.8 38.1
Compiled from the official reports of U.S. Supreme Court opinions for the 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms, utilizing the same
procedure described by Spaeth, "Supreme court disposition of federal circuit court decisions," 68 Judicature 246-47 (1985).
Docket numbers rather than case citations are counted, so "consolidated" cases are separately counted. Bifurcated disposi-
tions affirming in part and reversing in part are treated as half upheld and half overturned.
Table 5 Outcome of decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewed on petition by Solicitor
General, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms
Number upheld Total reviewed Per cent upheld
Circuit 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85 1983-84 1984-85
1st 0 0 1 0 0.0 -
2nd 0.5 0 3 0 16.7 -
3rd 1.5 1.0 5 2 30.0 50.0
4th 0 1.0 1 2 0 50.0
5th 0 0 0 1 - 0
6th 1.0 0 2 2 50.0 0
7th 1.0 0 1 1 100.0 0
8th 0 0 2 2 0 0
9th 0 0 15 12 0 0
10th 0 0 2 1 0 0
11th 0 0 1 0 0 -
D.C. 1.0 0.5 4 2 25.0 25.0
Totals 5.0 2.5 37 25 13.5 10.0
Compiled from the official reports of U.S. Supreme Court opinions for the 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms.
Second Circuits (see Table 2), the overall
data hardly supports an inference that
any circuit is being "targeted" for spe-
cial treatment.
When the number of petitions filed by
the Solicitor General is broken down by
circuit, however, the disproportionate
number of cases emanating from the
Ninth Circuit is immediately apparent.
Although the Ninth is the busiest of the
12 circuits, it still only handles 14 per
cent of the total caseload disposed of by
9. See, e.g., Overend, 9th Circuit is '0 for 22' in
High Court Reviews, Los ANGELES TimEs, June 25,
1984, at p. 1; Carrizosa, High Court Term Brings 27
Reversals for Ninth Circuit, Los ANGELES DAtLY
JOURNAL, July 13, 1984, at p.1; Bartlett, A Rare
Victory for Court in S.F., SAN FRANCtSCO CHRONI -
CLE, June 27, 1984, at p. 12; Baker, Activists on the
Ninth Circuit Strike Out, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
September 25, 1984, at p.28; Maher, 'Engine, Engine
Number 9... ,'CALIFORNIA LAWYER, February, 1985,
at p. 39.
10. Remarks of Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General,
delivered at Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference,
Seattle, Washington, August 16, 1984, at p. 4.
11. Florida v. Meyers, - U.S. - 80 L.Ed.2d 381,
104 S.Ct. 1852 (1984).
12. Id. at 80 L.Ed.2d at 386, 104 S.Ct. at 1855.
Compare Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. - - 105
S.Ct. 308,83 L.Ed.2d 165,171-75 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
13. Id. at - n. 3,80 L.Ed.2d at 387, n. 3,104 S.Ct.
at 1855, n. 3.
all U.S. Courts of Appeals each year (see
Table 2). In the 1983-84 Term, however,
34.7 per cent of the petitions filed by the
Solicitor General from all 12 circuits
were in Ninth Circuit cases, a total of 17
out of 49. That pattern is repeated in the
1984-85 Term, with 11 out of 43, or 25.6
per cent of the Solicitor General's peti-
tions being filed in Ninth Circuit cases
-24 of the 28 were granted, or 86 per
cent (see Table 3).
The Solicitor's high rate of success is
disproportionately reflected in the rever-
sal rate of the Ninth Circuit which
attracted so much attention after the
1983-84 Term. 9 While the Ninth Circuit
was reversed in 27 out of 29 cases, over
half of the reversals came in cases in
which the Solicitor General petitioned
for certiorari. The Ninth Circuit reversal
rate dropped to 24 out of 31 in the 1984-
85 Term, but again, 50 per cent of the
reversals were in cases brought by the
Solicitor General (see Tables 4 and 5).
Error correction
Several explanations might be offered
for the disproportionate attention the
Ninth Circuit is receiving from the Solic-
itor General. Most obvious is the sugges-
tion that the Ninth Circuit hands down
more erroneous decisions which require
correction than emanate from other cir-
cuits. It might be argued that this expla-
nation misconceives the role of the Su-
preme Court, however. The use of
Supreme Court hearings merely to cor-
rect the errors of lower courts would
involve the squandering of a scarce re-
source. The Solicitor authorizes only
one out of every six requests to file certi-
orari petitions which he receives.' 0 Pre-
sumably, every request involves a palpa-
ble claim of error. Cases should be se-
lected on the basis of their broad-scale
impact on the administration of justice.
If the Solicitor perceived his role as cor-
recting the errors of lower courts, he
could certainly find dozens of cases to
take up from each of the federal circuits
every year.
There is certainly a plausible basis to
suggest that the Burger Court itself is
assuming a greater role of error correc-
tion. At least in criminal cases, the Court
is resorting to the vehicle of summary
reversal in more and more cases every
term. During the 1983-84 Term, Justice
Stevens wrote an unusual dissent to one
of these reversals,tt pointing out that
this practice posed "disturbing ques-
tions concerning the Court's conception
of its role."
Each such case, considered individually,
may be regarded it [sic] as a welcome step
forward in the never ending war against
crime. Such decisions are certain to receive
widespread approbation, particularly by
members of society who have been victim-
ized by lawless conduct. But we must not
forget that a central purpose of our written
Constitution, and more specifically of its
unique creation of a life tenured federal
judiciary, was to ensure that certain rights
are firmly secured against possible oppres-
sion by the federal or state governments....
Yet the Court's recent history indicates that,
at least with respect to its summary disposi-
tions, it has been primarily concerned with
vindicating the will of the majority and less
interested in its role as a protector of the
individual's constitutional rights.1i
Justice Stevens cited 19 examples of
summary dispositions in the previous
three terms, all decided on the petition of
the warden or prosecutor, and all suc-
cessful "in obtaining reversal of a deci-
sion upholding a claim of constitutional
right."'t" During the 1984-85 Term, Jus-
HeinOnline  -- 69 Judicature 363 1985-1986
Table 6 Per cent of appeals reversed by
U.S. Courts of Appeals after hearing
or submission
Circuit
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.
All circuits
All cases
1983 1984
18.6 20.6
13.7 16.4
13.8 13.0
20.8 22.2
17.5 18.9
15.7 17.4
15.8 12.4
14.7 16.5
16.9 16.5
11.5 16.3
17.5 13.0
12.1 15.9
15.9 16.3
Criminal cases
1983 1984
17.9 7.8
8.2 9.5
10.7 6.4
10.6 6.6
8.2 12.4
10.5 11.7
5.5 3.7
7.6 8.3
12.2 15.6
13.4 11.0
5.6 7.0
4.1 2.9
9.4 9.7
Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1983 and 1984,
Table B-1.
tice Brennan returned to this theme, not-
ing that eight more cases had been added
to Justice Stevens' list during the current
term, and concluding, "Because I find
this one-sided practice of summary error
correction inappropriate, I would vote
merely to deny this petition for certi-
orari."14
An analysis of the origin of the 27
cases summarily reversed during the past
four terms reveals a significant pattern-
20 of the 27 emanated from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, of which eight, or 40
per cent, were Ninth Circuit cases. Four
of the cases were before the Court on a
petition for certiorari filed by the Solici-
tor General, the only four which in-
volved direct appeals from a judgment of
conviction. The other cases all involved
federal habeas corpus proceedings, in
which the petitions for certiorari were
filed by state authorities. Curiously, all
four of the summarily reversed cases
brought to the Court by the Solicitor
emanated from the Ninth Circuit.
Since the Burger Court is willing to
devote more of its docket to the process of
error correction in criminal cases, the
Solicitor General appears to be selecting
some cases for review on that basis. But it
seems remarkable that such a dispropor-
tionate share of the cases deserving of
such attention would be found in one
federal circuit.
The suggestion that the Ninth Circuit
hands down more erroneous decisions
which need correction than do other cir-
cuits also appears implausible. A deci-
sion can only be labeled "erroneous," of
course, if it is reversed by the Supreme
Court. The decision of the Supreme
Court is "infallible only because [it is]
final."t The mere fact that the Ninth
364 Judicature Volume 69, Number 6
Table 7 Per cent of criminal appeals
reversed: Ninth Circuit vs. all
circuits
Ninth Circuit All ci
1971 15.3
1972 16.4
1973 16.3
1974 17.3
1975 18.8
1976 13.8
1977 12.3
1978 12.1
1979 12.0
1980 15.9
1981 15.2
1982 11.1
Average 14.7
rcuits
12.6
13.4
12.5
13.2
11.8
10.7
10.3
10.9
10.3
11.2
11.9
9.7
11.5
Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1971-1982, Table
B-1.
Circuit suffered three times as many re-
versals as any other circuit two years in a
row may simply be attributable to the
number of its cases brought to the Court
by the Solicitor, rather than the overall
quality of its decisions. One qualitative
clue might be the degree of unanimity of
the Supreme Court in Ninth Circuit re-
versals. If the rate of unanimity is signif-
icantly higher than that for other cases
decided by the Court, one might infer
that the "degree" of error in the Ninth
Circuit cases reviewed is greater. Actu-
ally, the overall degree of unanimity in
the Supreme Court's decisions reached
the highest peak in many years during
the past two terms-40 per cent of all
published decisions in each term were
unanimous."o The degree of unanimity
in Ninth Circuit reversals was not sub-
stantially greater: 39 per cent of the 1983-
84 reversals were unanimous, while 46
per cent of the 1984-85 reversals lacked
dissents."?
Even when the unanimous reversals are
individually analyzed, one is frequently
left with the haunting question of why
such a case ever found its way into the
hallowed chambers of the United States
Supreme Court. Many of these cases sim-
14. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. - -
85 L.Ed.2d 462, 467-68, 105 S.Ct. 2103, 2106 (1985).
15. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring):
"However, reversal by a higher court is not proof
that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt
that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substan-
tial proportion of our reversals of state courts
would also be reversed. We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final."
16. Supreme Court Review, NATIONAL LAW JOUR-
NAL, September 2, 1985, at p. S-3, indicating a steady
climb in the proportion of unanimous decisions
from a low of 25 per cent in the 1979-80 Term.
17. Compiled from official reports of U.S. Su-
preme Court opinions, 1983-85. It should be noted
ply present no issue with any discernible
impact upon the overall administration
of justice, involving unique factual con-
figurations which will rarely recur.'"
Win-loss record
While an "erroneous" lower court deci-
sion from the perspective of the Supreme
Court is one which is actually reversed,
from the perspective of the Solicitor
General it may simply be one which the
government has lost in the lower court.
One explanation for the larger propor-
tion of Ninth Circuit cases on the Solici-
tor's Supreme Court docket may simply
be that the government loses more of its
cases in the Ninth than in other circuits.
While the government's win-loss rec-
ord cannot be ascertained for appeals in
civil cases, the record for criminal cases
is readily available. With rare excep-
tions, all appeals from criminal cases are
brought by defendants, so every reversal
is a loss for the government. When the
criminal reversal rate for the Ninth Cir-
cuit is compared with other circuits (see
Table 6), this explanation appears plau-
sible. The Ninth Circuit criminal re-
versal rate was highest of all circuits in
1984, and third highest in 1983. Closer
examination of this reversal rate, how-
ever, suggests it has more to do with the
nature of the caseload than the "liberal-
ity" of Ninth Circuit judges. When the
criminal reversal rate in the Ninth Cir-
cuit is analyzed for the 12 year period
preceding 1983-84 (see Table 7), it can be
seen that the Ninth Circuit has always
maintained a higher reversal rate than
the other circuits, and that the 1983-84
rates are close to the 12-year average of
14.7 per cent for the Ninth Circuit.
There is certainly no basis in this data to
attribute a higher reversal rate to the
influx of Carter appointees, since the
average criminal reversal rate in the
that the 40 per cent overall unanimity rate for the
Supreme Court includes both affirmances and re-
versals. The unanimity rate forjust reversals may be
lower, so the unanimity rate in Ninth Circuit rever-
sals would reflect greater disparity.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 471 U.S.
85 L.Ed.2d 99,105 S.Ct. 1811 (1985); United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. - 83 L.Ed.2d 450, 105 S.Ct. 465
(1984); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. - 83
L.Ed.2d 461, 105 S.Ct. 471 (1984). Compare the
conclusions reached by Estreicher & Sexton, New
York University Supreme Court Project, 59
N.Y.U.L. REV. 481 (1984), described as an "unusu-
ally perceptive study of this court's docket" by Jus-
tice Stevens. California v. Carney, -U.S. - - 105
S.Ct. 2066,, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 418 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
April-May, 1986
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Ninth Circuit was higher before 1977
than after. While the government appar-
ently does lose more appeals in the
Ninth Circuit than in other circuits, this
is not a new phenomenon, but a consist-
ent pattern with a 15-year history.
Influencing en banc hearings
Another explanation for the dispropor-
tionate attention the Solicitor General is
giving the Ninth Circuit involves a very
practical process of case management. In
addition to controlling all petitions for
certiorari by federal authorities, the So-
licitor also determines whether a rehear-
ing en banc should be sought in a court
of appeals. To the extent that the Solicitor
can convince judges at the court of
appeals level that the denial of a rehear-
ing en banc is simply a prelude to
Supreme Court review, and Supreme
Court review means a substantial prob-
ability of Supreme Court reversal, he
may be able to increase his rate of success
on petitions for en banc hearings, and
get at least some of the decisions he is
unhappy with reversed without having
to bother the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor's rate of success in peti-
tions for en banc hearings in the courts
of appeals is substantially lower than his
success rate in petitions for certiorari in
the Supreme Court. Over the course of
the four year period from 1980-84, the 12
courts of appeals denied 81 per cent of
the en banc petitions authorized by the
Solicitor General. 9 The Solicitor is twice
as likely to petition for certiorari in a
case where his en banc petition is denied
than in a case where no such petition
was filed.20 And the prospects for having
such a certiorari petition granted and the
case reversed is even higher than the
Solicitor's phenomenal "normal" rate. 21
These convincing figures were the pre-
lude to an ominous warning which
Solicitor General Rex E. Lee delivered to
the judges of the Ninth Circuit at their
1984 Judicial Conference in Seattle:
19. Remarks of Rex E. Lee, supra n. 10, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4-5.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Figures were compiled from the published
decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals in F.2d.
24. The Ninth Circuit granted 14 en banc hear-
ings in 1983, 12 in 1984, and 9 in the first 10months
of 1985: 37 per cent of hearings granted were on
petition by the Solicitor General. (Figures supplied
to author by Cathy Catterson, Acting Clerk, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, October 18,
1985.)
25. Gottschall, Carter's judicial appointments:
The spectre of
judicial politics
may be lurking
in the background.
... Both at the certiorari stage and also the
merits stage, we have had a higher rate of
success-by about 20 percentage points in
each instance-with our cases that have
gone through an en banc denial, than is
true of our cases in general... The fact that
I have authorized en banc rehearing indi-
cates a fair statistical possibility that a peti-
tion for certiorari may follow.2
2
Viewed from this perspective, the tar-
geting of the Ninth Circuit for so many
reversals may have been a prelude to the
subliminal message presented to the
Ninth Circuit judges: Avoid the embar-
rassment of so many Supreme Court re-
versals by granting more of our en banc
petitions and cleaning up your own act.
The message loses much of its force,
however, when we count up the number
of Ninth Circuit cases that the Solicitor
took to the Supreme Court during the
past two terms which were preceded by a
petition for en banc hearing in the Ninth
Circuit. Of the 28 certiorari petitions
filed, only 4 were preceded by an en banc
petition. One of the 4 was granted and
heard en banc. Actually, this rate of 14
per cent is substantially lower than the
other federal circuits. During the same
two terms, of the 64 petitions for certio-
rari filed from decisions of circuits other
than the Ninth, 33, or 51 per cent, were
preceded by petitions for en banc hear-
ings, of which only one was granted!23
Thus, it appears that the Solicitor pur-
sued en banc hearings with less fre-
the influence of affirmative action and merit selec-
tion on voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67
JUOICATURE 164, 167 (1983).
26. See n. 9, supra.
27. Flaherty, Inside the 'Invisible' Courts, NA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 2, 1983, at p. 28.
28. Granelli, 9th Circuit Rejects Split; Wants
Time to Experiment, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
March 28, 1983, at p. 34. The Ninth Circuit utilizes
a limited en banc court consistingof the chiefjudge
and 10 additional judges drawn by lot for en banc
hearings. See Rule 25, Rules of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
29. Id.
quency and greater success in the Ninth
than in other circuits, at least in cases he
subsequently presented to the Supreme
Court. It would appear, then, that he was
delivering his "message" in the wrong
forum. In any event, the message was
ignored. The number of en banc peti-
tions granted in the Ninth Circuit con-
tinued to decline in 1985.24
Machiavellian politics?
The final possible explanation for the
Solicitor General's preoccupation with
the Ninth Circuit is the most Machiavel-
lian. The Ninth Circuit is, without a
doubt, the court most profoundly influ-
enced by the judicial appointments of
President Jimmy Carter: 15 of the 23
judges active on the court during the
period in question were put there by
him.25 The embarrassment of an unusu-
ally high reversal rate for this court
could achieve a number of political ob-
jectives. It could add credibility to the
claim that President Reagan needed four
more years to correct an "imbalance" in
the federal judiciary. The impact of his
judicial appointments, and the denigra-
tion of his predecessor's judicial appoint-
ments, played a prominent role in the
political rhetoric of the 1984 presidential
campaign. In the midst of that cam-
paign, in the summer of 1984, news-
paper stories were widely circulated
under such headline banners as "Acti-
vists on the Ninth Circuit Strike Out.''26
In addition to presidential politics,
the spectre of judicial politics may also
be lurking in the background. Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger has made no secret of
his determination to split up the Ninth
Circuit, publicly labeling it an "unman-
ageable administrative monstrosity" 27
and criticizing the practice of limiting
en banc hearings to a minority of the
judges on the court.28 The judges of the
Ninth Circuit appear united in their
opposition to bifurcation.2 9 A public
perception that the Ninth Circuit is
seriously "out of step" with other federal
courts can only help the Chief Justice's
campaign to dismantle it.
An analysis of the Ninth Circuit deci-
sions reversed by the Supreme Court
supports the premise that ideological dif-
ferences certainly play an important part
in the confrontation. The judges ap-
pointed by President Carter are clearly
responsible for the vast majority of the
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Table 8 Ninth Circuit judges concurring In
decisions reversed by U.S. Supreme
Court, 1983-84 and 1984-85 Terms
Carter appointees
Alarcon
Boochever
Canby
Faris
Ferguson
Fletcher
Hug
Nelson
Norris
Poole
Pregerson
Reinhardt
Schroeder
Skopil
'rang
Average for Carter appointees:
Non-Carter appointees
Anderson
Browning
Choy
Duniway
Goodwin
Kennedy
Kilkenny
Sneed
Wallace
Wright
Average for non-Carter appointees:
Number of cases
3
5
10
2
13
8
4
5
6
4
8
10
4
5
II
6.5
Compiled from published decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in F.2d.
decisions being reversed (see Table 8).
This shouldn't surprise anyone, how-
ever. The Supreme Court Justices ap-
pointed by presidents Nixon and Rea-
gan are just as clearly responsible for
A reply and rejoinder
Reply
by Harold J. Spaeth
I hold no brief in support of or in oppo-
sition to Professor Uelmen's thesis con-
cerning the reversal rate of the Ninth
Circuit. I do submit, however, that he
has not proven his case.
He asserts that two of the findings I
reported, "Supreme Court disposition of
federal circuit court decisions," 68 Judi-
cature 245 (1985), are "premature." He
bases his judgment on an analysis of but
two terms of the Burger Court's deci-
sions, notwithstanding my additional
finding-encompassing 14 terms-that
marked variations occurred in the man-
ner in which the Supreme Court dis-
posed of cases from specific circuits over
the course of two or three terms. Id. at
250. Thus, any given circuit could expect
a period or two during which its deci-
sions would be upheld or reversed at a
rate markedly variant from that attained
over the entire 14 years.
Apart from the fact that Solicitor Gen-
Table 9 Votes of Supreme Court Justices In Conclusion
1984-8
Justice
Burger, C.J.
Blackmun
Brennan
Marshall
O'Connor
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
White
Compiled from offic
opinions.
more of the rev
logical differer
does not dispe
numbers may
drama of the
The same ideo
nate the Fifth
President Cart
their active j ud
of the cases tI
Supreme Cour
in the past two
Table 5). But it
tions filed by th
Fifth and Sixtl
was 14, compa
Circuit alone (:
he grand total of cert peti-
he Solicitor from both the
h Circuits for both terms
ared to 28 for the Ninth
see Table 3).
eral Lee has himself labeled Uelmen's
conclusions "dead wrong" in an article
which appeared in the Los Angeles Daily
Journal, December 18, 1985, at page 17,
Uelmen's imputation of causality to an
association between Lee and the treat-
ment the Supreme Court accorded the
Ninth Circuit is no more scholarly or
scientific than attaching causality to a
post hoc, propter hoc relationship. 0
HAROLD J. SPAETH is a professor of politi-
calscience at Michigan State University and a
member of the Michigan Bar.
Rejoinder
By Gerald F. Uelmen
The full statement by former Solicitor
General Rex Lee, who was sent an
advance copy of this article, as quoted in
the Los Angeles Daily Journal, Decem-
ber 18, 1985, is as follows:
Lee, reached at his Washington, D.C., law
firm, said he respected Uelmen's scholar-
ship but called his conclusions "almost
flattering and dead wrong." He said he
30. Gottschall, supra n. 25, at 167.
GERALD F UELMEN is a professor of law at
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles).
"subconsciously" may have been more
skeptical of Ninth Circuit decisions than
those from other circuits but only because
the Ninth Circuit's opinions had displayed
"a judicial philosophy that is not favora-
ble to the government." Lee said he and
"many of the people in my office" devel-
oped an impression that "there were pan-
els of the Ninth Circuit that were more
likely to commit error or were more likely
to make rulings that were opposed by the
government than would the average Court
of Appeals panel throughout the country."
Said Lee, "That is quite different from set-
ting out in advance to target a particular
circuit for more intensive scrutiny."
Several inferences might be drawn
from this statement, just as several infer-
ences might be drawn from the data I've
compiled. While the suggestion that
considerations of judicial politics might
affect the selection of circuit court deci-
sions for the Supreme Court docket may
be difficult to stuff into a computer, the
possibility should not be dismissed out
of hand. Political naivete is hardly a pre-
requisite to drawing scholarly or sci-
entific conclusions.
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5 Terms The remarkable reversal record compiled
No. of cases No of cases by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
in majority in dissent Ninth Circuit in the U.S. Supreme Court
49 2 in the past two terms can be seen, at least
46 2 in part, as the handiwork of the Solicitor31 20
30 21 General. It cannot be wholly explained
48 3 by thecourt's higher propensity forerror
41 3
47 4 or stubborn refusal to reconsider its deci-
36 15 sions en banc. Rather than reflecting a
48 3
court which is ideologically "out of
ial reports of U.S. Supreme Court step," it may simply reflect a Justice
Department which is carefully selecting
'ersals (see Table 9). Ideo- its target. The perception of the Ninth
ices are a factor, but that Circuit Court of Appeals as a "liberal"
l the inference that the court packed with Carter appointees is
be manipulated and the certainly a perception shared by the Jus-
confrontation contrived. tice Department. To the extent that that
logical differences domi- perception affects the selection of cases
and Sixth Circuits, with for Supreme Court review, it necessarily
ter filling two-thirds of affects the validity of Professor Spaeth's
geships.30 Eighty per cent. conclusion that the Supreme Court does
he Solicitor took to the not differ in the treatment of federal cir-
t from those two circuits cuit court decisions depending on which
terms were reversed (see circuit they emanate from. 0
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